



Measurement matters –  




















 Author’s affiliation 
Institute of Materials Resource Management 
Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences 
University of Augsburg 
Alter Postweg 101 
86135 Augsburg, Germany 
b
 Author’s affiliation 
Department of Finance, Audit, Accounting and Control 
ICN Business School Nancy-Metz (Grande école) - CEREFIGE 
3 place Edouard Branly 
57070 Metz, France 
 
2017 
 JEL Classifications: C83, F21, G31  
For black-and-white print 
                                                     
*

































Measurement matters –  
A meta-study of the determinants of corporate capital structure 
 
Abstract 
This study aggregates the mixed empirical evidence of the seven most commonly investigated 
determinants of corporate capital structure. We apply meta-regression analysis on a data set of 
3,890 reported results, manually collected from 100 primary studies covering firm observations 
from 57 countries over the past 65 years. Our results reveal that – in descending order of 
importance – tangible assets (positive sign), market-to-book ratio (negative sign), and profitability 
(negative sign) are significant determinants of corporate debt level. In addition, we identify the 
presence of publication selection bias in academic literature. Accordingly, specific results are 
systematically overrepresented, as authors prefer reporting statistically significant estimates in line 
with theory or corresponding to previous empirical research. Significant determinants as well as 
publication selection bias are more pronounced for characteristics like market-based measures of 
capital structure or total debt measures of capital structure or for top articles from highly renowned 
journals, as compared to book-based measures of capital structure or long-term debt measures of 
capital structure or randomly selected articles including more unknown and unpublished studies. 
Overall, these findings highlight the need to relativize existing statistically significant results in this 
field and instead provide independent analyses in future for scientific progress. 
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Although the past 60 years of research have yielded a surge of empirical literature on the 
determinants of capital structure, various authors in this major discipline of corporate finance 
conclude that the overall picture is rather mixed (An, Li, & Yu, 2016; Schmid, 2013; Denis & 
McKeon, 2012; Hovakimian, 2006; Strebulaev, 2007). Over just the past five years (2012 – 2016), 
the number of studies has increased by more than 300 articles, each proposing its own set of core 
determinants (among others, Frank & Goyal, 2009; Öztekin, 2015). Such fast growth amplifies the 
inconclusiveness of empirical findings rather than presenting a solution.  
In their seminal work, Harris and Raviv (1991) are the first to summarize and classify existing 
empirical evidence on the determinants of capital structure. One of their key findings refers to the 
large heterogeneity that characterizes previous empirical results:  
“Comparisons suffer from the fact that these studies used different 
measures of the firm characteristics, different time periods, different 
leverage measures, and different methodologies.” 
(Harris & Raviv, 1991, p. 336) 
As stated in their review, Harris and Raviv (1991) assume that specific study characteristics 
systematically affect the results of primary studies. Meta-regression analysis (MRA) is a 
commonly-used quantitative review technique that explicitly models the impact of these different 
study characteristics and thus provides a statistical tool to explain heterogeneity in existing research 
results. By means of MRA, previous studies successfully reveal important new insights into various 
fundamental questions in financial economics research (among many others, Arnold, Rathgeber, & 
Stöckl, 2014; Feld, Heckemeyer, & Overesch, 2013; Goerg & Strobl, 2001; Hang, Geyer-
Klingeberg, Rathgeber, & Stoeckl, 2016; Havránek & Irsova, 2011; Kysucky & Norden, 2015).  
In this paper, we employ MRA to synthesize empirical studies on the determinants of capital 
structure with the following intentions. First, we analyze the seven most commonly investigated 
determinants of capital structure, extending the existing work by Feld et al. (2013), who present a 
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comprehensive meta-study on the impact of taxes on corporate debt financing. Second, MRA 
allows calculation of the average effect of each of the seven analyzed capital structure determinants 
across studies. Therein, we make use of 3,890 reported results collected from 100 representative 
studies, selected from a total pool of 591 relevant primary studies. Third, besides the simple 
aggregation of effects, we aim to explore the reasons why empirical evidence appears to be 
inordinately different. To study the sources of within-study and between-study heterogeneity, we 
include 32 different study characteristics that potentially affect the variation in reported results. 
These factors cover measurement differences, regional differences, data characteristics, publication 
characteristics, and differences in model specification.  
By conducting meta-analytical techniques, this paper contributes to existing research on the 
determinants of corporate capital structure in several ways. First, we provide the first quantitative 
literature review aggregating the various determinants of capital structure. By studying 
heterogeneity among empirical outcomes, we aim to explore the differences across studies as 
emphasized by Harris and Raviv (1991). As an advantage over (traditional) qualitative reviews 
(among others, Nyamita, Garbharran, & Dorasamy, 2014; Pandey & Singh, 2015), meta-analysis 
provides a toolset for more objective and comprehensive quantitative reviews (Stanley, 2001). For 
example, meta-analysis allows assignment of study weights based on the reliability of reported 
results, summarization of all effects from primary studies within a single statistical measure, and 
correction of potential model misspecification in primary studies. Second, we extend the previous 
meta-study by Feld et al. (2013) by investigating the impact of 32 study characteristics on the seven 
most frequently analyzed capital structure determinants, namely tangible assets, non-debt tax 
shields, market-to-book ratio, firm growth, firm size, earnings volatility, and profitability. Third, 
compared to existing primary research, ours simultaneously analyzes all potential explanatory 
factors in a multiple regression framework to avoid spurious effects. Finally, we also test for the 
existence of publication selection bias in this field of research, which allows for inferences on the 
impact of existing theories and influential studies (among others, Harris & Raviv, 1991; Rajan & 
Zingales, 1995; Titman & Wessels, 1988) on the probability that authors select certain results for 
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publication. Consequently, the analysis provides important indications of the reliability of certain 
groups of study results.  
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical 
foundation. Section 3 presents the literature search process, the preparation of the data, and the 
descriptive statistics. The methodological framework of MRA is outlined in Section 4. The 
subsequent Section 5 reports the results of the MRA. In Section 6 we describe the results of the 
robustness tests. Lastly, Section 7 concludes the study.  
2 Capital structure theory 
Assuming a Modigliani-and-Miller world without market imperfections, the choice of capital 
structure should not affect the cost of capital (Modigliani & Miller, 1958). By introducing the 
concept of market frictions, several scholars have developed specific capital structure theories, 
thereby assigning meaning to the choice of capital structure. Multiple theories have been well-
studied over the last decades covering three major strands (Cole, 2013). For testing, academics 
make use of several firm characteristics. The subsequent section presents the theoretical 
framework, followed by the explanation of the connected firm characteristics used in empirical 
research.  
2.1 Theories 
First, the tradeoff theory developed by Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) assumes that firms set 
their target leverage ratio by balancing costs of bankruptcy and tax benefits. On the one hand, the 
costs of bankruptcy increase with extended leverage due to the rising amount of fixed interest 
payments and expected costs of financial distress. On the other hand, tax benefits occur since 
interest payments are tax-deductible expenses (tax shield). Hence, the optimal leverage is reached 
when tax benefits offset the costs of bankruptcy. Consequently, firms’ financing decisions are 
assumed to move their capital structure to an optimum.   
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Second, the pecking order theory by Myers (1984) suggests a hierarchical financing strategy 
depending on the degree of information asymmetry between managers and investors. To minimize 
the costs of borrowing, the source of capital with the lowest degree of information asymmetry is 
preferred. Generally, this procedure implies that internal funds are favored against external funds 
and for the latter, debt financing is favored against equity financing. Compared to the tradeoff 
theory, there is no optimal capital structure. 
Third, the more recent market timing theory by Baker and Wurgler (2002) proposes that firms 
tend to issue equity in times of high market-to-book values and debt when market-to-book values 
are low. This means that the development of the capital structure is determined by the development 
of equity markets. Leverage decreases when capital is needed during bullish markets. In contrast, 
leverage increases when capital is needed during bearish markets. As with the pecking order 
theory, there is no optimal target capital structure.  
This selection of theories is without any claim of comprehensiveness. The theories selected here 
are the most frequently represented theories in empirical literature, a fact which contributes to the 
feasibility of a meta-analysis. There are several additional theories, namely agency theory (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976), signaling theory (Ross, 1977), or free cash flow theory (Jensen, 1986), which 
aim to explain the capital structure decision based on behavioral aspects.   
2.2 Determinants of capital structure 
In primary studies, the theoretical hypotheses are tested by certain proxy variables representing 
the determinants of capital structure. Typically, a linear regression model is applied to estimate the 
impact of the proxy variables on the corporate debt level: 
 𝐿𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝐶𝑖,𝑡+𝑒𝑖,𝑡. (1) 
Li,t represents the leverage ratio of firm i in time t. The variables Di,t  are assumed to determine 
the leverage ratio, and capture different firm characteristics. Ci,t  refers to a set of control variables, 
and ei,t denotes the error term. The vector β contains the parameters of interest, which measure the 
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direction and strength of the impact of the determinants on the leverage ratio. These regression 
coefficients serve as input for our MRA. 
Table 1 sums up the direction of the hypothetical influence of the corresponding proxy variables 
on capital structure, separately for each of the three theories. In this paper, we concentrate on the 
seven most frequently analyzed firm characteristics. To achieve meaningful estimates in our MRA, 
we only include the proxy variables for which more than 250 results are reported in the selected 
100 primary studies. This limit is chosen as it exceeds 191, which is the mean number of 
observations in a summary of 140 different meta-analyses as reported by Nelson and Kennedy 
(2009). 
[PLEASE INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
When linking the proxy variables to capital structure under the tradeoff theory, one might 
expect a positive impact of tangible assets on leverage. Tangible assets in particular serve as 
collateral and achieve more stable prices in the case of liquidation (Cole 2013). The presence of 
non-debt related tax shields should lead to a lower leverage ratio as they represent a substitute for 
tax benefits arising from debt financing (Huang and Song 2006). For firm growth, the pecking-
order theory assumes a positive association with leverage because investments are directly linked 
to cash outflows, which increase the need for additional financial resources (Frank and Goyal 
2009). For market-to-book ratio, Cole (2013) proposes a negative impact on leverage. He argues 
that growth opportunities in terms of intangible assets lead to higher costs of financial distress, 
consequently lowering the portion of external financing required. As large firms are often more 
diversified, increasing firm size is commonly associated with lower direct bankruptcy costs 
(Titman and Wessels 1988). Hence, larger firms are supposed to have more debt. For firm risk 
measured by earnings volatility, tradeoff theory predicts a negative sign for the relation to leverage. 
Since income volatility induces higher expected costs of financial distress, more volatile firms 
should have lower leverage ratios (Frank and Goyal 2009). This is supported by the fact that more 
volatile firms have a lower probability to profit from tax shields. Finally, higher profitability 
decreases the probability of financial distress and offers additional possibilities for deduction. Both 
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aspects speak for a positive relation between profitability and leverage under the tradeoff theory 
(Cole 2013).  
Continuing with the pecking-order theory, tangible assets are assumed to lower the degree of 
information asymmetry due to ease of valuation by outsiders (Harris and Raviv 1991). Thus, 
leverage should be positively related to tangible assets. However, in a similar vein, equity issuances 
become less costly if information asymmetry decreases, potentially reducing the level of debt 
financing (Frank and Goyal 2009). Furthermore, firm growth supports debt issuances due to the 
consequently larger financing requirements, which increases the demand of debt financing (Frank 
and Goyal 2009). Further, there should be a negative relation between market-to-book ratio and 
leverage, as future growth opportunities rarely serve as collateral (Titman and Wessels 1988). 
Regarding firm size, pecking-order theory assumes a negative impact on leverage: as large firms 
provide better information to outside investors, information asymmetries are lowered and equity 
financing encouraged (Huang and Song 2006). Moreover, increased earnings volatility raises 
investment uncertainty of outsiders (Frank and Goyal 2009). Hence, more volatile firms suffer 
more from adverse selection due to increasing information asymmetry. For such firms, debt 
financing beneficially leads to relatively higher leverage ratios. Following the general idea of the 
pecking-order theory, retained earnings constitute the favored form of financing. This implies that 
more profitable firms should have lower leverage ratios (Titman and Wessels 1988). 
Under the market timing theory, the market-to-book ratio serves as an indicator for the choice of 
capital source. When stock prices – and consequently market-to-book ratios – are high, firms are 
supposed to issue equity (Rajan and Zingales 1995). Thus, temporarily low leverage ratios 
probably occur during bullish markets. 
3 Data 
As a first step in our analysis, we collect data from empirical literature analyzing the 
determinants of corporate capital structure. The data search and the subsequent analyses comply 
with the established guidelines published by the Meta-Analysis of Economics Research Network 
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(Stanley et al., 2013). As described in Appendix A, we address all compulsory issues that are part 
of the guidelines concerning literature search, data preparation, and methodology as outlined 
hereafter.1  
3.1 Literature search 
Information about the existing results on the determinants of corporate capital structure decision 
is directly drawn from the respective empirical primary studies. In line with the objective of this 
meta-analysis, the relevant primary studies are selected by the following three content-related 
criteria. (1) To assure a sufficient comparability of the data set, each study should empirically 
analyze the determinants of corporate capital structure. (2) The dependent variable in the analysis 
must be a measure of the corporate capital structure. (3) As is common practice, only results for 
non-financial firms are included. In addition, there are three data-related criteria a study must fulfill 
to be integrated in our MRA. (1) The effect size measuring the relation between the determinants 
and capital structure must be reported in the form of regression coefficients as captured by 𝛽 in 
Equation (1). (2) The study’s sample size, or the degrees of freedom respectively, must be 
extractable in order to calculate the variation of the extracted effect-sizes and the study weights. (3) 
The study must also report country-specific results to allow an unambiguous assignment of 
regional variables to the specific regression coefficients.  
We started our four-step literature search procedure with (1) an extensive search using the 
following electronic databases: ABI/INFORM Complete, Business Source Premier, EconLit, and 
GreenFILE. Next, we explicitly searched for unpublished literature by screening the electronic 
working paper database SSRN using the same search strategy as for published articles. The 
resulting sample of relevant studies serves as a basis for (2) a backward search in the reference lists 
of the studies and (3) a forward search via the “cited by”-option in Google Scholar. We also 
checked (4) the publication lists of authors who are involved in more than one relevant study. 
                                                     
1 To ensure a sufficient quality of data extracted from the studies, we first developed a common 
understanding of all variables to be collected from the primary studies. Afterwards, one author extracted the 
data for the full sample of studies. During this data preparation process, each uncertainty was discussed 
among the authors until a common consensus for the discordant data point was found. 
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Appendix B provides detailed information about the whole search procedure together with the 
exact numbers of studies identified in each step. 
In total, 591 studies meet the content-related criteria.2 Appendix C shows the distribution of the 
publication year of the studies. The sample covers 101 unpublished studies (dissertations, working 
papers and conference papers), corresponding to 17.09% of the full sample. Due to the richness of 
available data, we decided to restrict this MRA to 50 top articles published in highly renowned 
journals (further referred to as “top articles”) and further 50 randomly selected articles including 
more unknown and unpublished (further referred to as “randomly selected articles”).3 The inclusion 
of such a mixed set of studies is especially important in order to cover the different explanatory 
variables in our MRA with a sufficient number of observations. To control for potential differences 
in study quality, we integrate corresponding explanatory variables in our regression models. The 
aggregated sample of 100 studies should be an appropriate and representative compromise 
concerning study quality and study variability. Moreover, it should be noted that this study sample 
is still twice as large as the average study sample used in previous meta-analyses (Nelson 
& Kennedy, 2009; Doucouliagos & Stanley, 2013). A list of the 100 primary studies included in 
the MRA can be found in Appendix D.  
Although the study sample provides results for numerous determinants, we focus on the most 
frequently used variables to yield statistically meaningful results. In detail, we analyze asset 
tangibility (TANG), non-debt tax shield (NDTS), firm growth (GROW), growth opportunities 
(MTB), firm size (SIZE), earnings volatility (EVOL), and profitability (PROF) in our MRA.4 Table 
2 provides an overview of the variables, the employed (quite homogeneous) definitions, as well as 
the number of estimates extracted from primary studies, which varies from 299 to 910. We 
                                                     
2 Meta-analysis requires that the studies in the sample are statistically independent (Hunter & Schmidt, 
2004). Therefore, studies from the same co-authors that build on an identical data set should be excluded in 
order to avoid double-counting (Stanley & Doucouliagos, 2012). In contrast, different data sets from the 
same authors and overlapping or equal datasets in studies from different authors are defined as independent 
(Doucouliagos & Ulubasoglu, 2008; Hunter & Schmidt, 2004). Overall, no study had to be excluded due to 
data dependencies. 
3 We use the recursive RePEc Journal Impact Factor for the valuation of the journals. This factor is chosen as 
it incorporates the quality of citations and comprises a wide range of economic journals (among others, 
Valickova, Havránek, & Horváth, 2015).  
4 At this point it should be noted that the variable abbreviations refer to the relation between capital structure 




collected all reported results instead of selecting a single representative estimate from each study, 
following an established consensus in MRA research (among others, Valickova, Havránek, & 
Horváth, 2015; Doucouliagos & Stanley, 2009). We also correct for potential within-study 
dependencies in our methodological approach. Moreover, this procedure does not require the 
subjective selection of one representative estimate for each study, but allows a more detailed 
analysis of the within-study variation that arises from differences in the applied methodology and 
model specification.   
[PLEASE INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
3.2 Effect size 
For effect size, we use the partial correlation coefficient (r), which is directly drawn from 
regression results reported in primary studies. In this way, we measure the intensity of the relation 
between capital structure and a certain determinant, while holding all other factors from the 






with the standard deviation 




where tij denotes the test statistic from the t-test applied on the j-th regression slope in study i and df 
represents the degrees of freedom related to this test statistic (Stanley & Doucouliagos, 2012). To 
achieve normally distributed effect sizes, we use Fisher’s z-transformation to correct for skewness 
in r. For more details on the calculation of the partial correlation r as well as the z-transformed 
values with the corresponding standard errors, please refer to Appendix E. 
This effect size contains several advantages (Stanley & Doucouliagos, 2012). First, although the 
direct use of regression coefficients already has the positive characteristic of filtering out disruptive 
effects and to isolate the effect of interest (such as, for example, used by Belz, Hagen, & Steffens, 
2016; Feld et al., 2013), it does not fulfill the requirement of comparability across studies. In 
contrast, the partial correlation coefficient enables us to make the effects comparable in scale and 
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measure across the employed proxy variables. Second, compared to the zero-order correlations as 
frequently used in management research (among others, Bhaskar-Shrinivas, Harrison, Shaffer, & 
Luk, 2005; Post & Byron, 2015), the partial correlation as preferred in economics allows a detailed 
analysis of misspecification bias by investigating variations in estimation models and integrated 
control variables. Third, the use of partial correlations maximizes the sample of primary studies and 
effect sizes to be included in our sample. Particularly, it allows integration of multiple estimates per 
study as most articles report results for several regression models from different specifications or 
subsamples. Overall, this effect size increases the sample size, enables the analysis of within-study 
variation, and enhances the variability in the data set (Chaikumburg, Doucouliagos, & 
Scarborough, 2016).  
3.3 Descriptive statistics 
To give a first impression of the collected effect sizes Table 3 presents summary statistics of the 
partial correlation coefficients as well as arithmetic and weighted averages across the 100 primary 
studies. Overall, it can be seen that the different calculations of the mean effects lead to different 
results. Starting with the simple average partial correlation, the same weight is assigned to each 
effect size regardless of its precision. This approach also does not consider potential publication 
selection, which might heavily bias toward average effects (as outlined in the methodology section 
and analyzed in detail in the subsequent MRA). For the consideration of precision, meta-analysis 
provides two alternative calculations: a fixed effects and a random effects model. The fixed effects 
model assumes the effect sizes to be drawn from the same population. The effect sizes are weighted 
by the inverse variance, which implies that larger weights are assigned to larger studies reporting 
more precise estimates. Comparing the fixed effects means with the simple averages reveals 
remarkable deviations from the simple arithmetic mean for TANG (0.046 to 0.024), GROW (0.058 
to 0.043), SIZE (0.051 to 0.021), EVOL (-0.021 to -0.031), and PROF (-0.066 to -0.030). This 
development shows that the effects tend to decrease when larger studies receive more weight, 
which might be seen as a first indication of the presence of publication selection. Hence, smaller 
studies especially seem to report larger results, thereby offsetting high standard errors and 
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achieving more significant results. In contrast, random effects models additionally consider 
unsystematic between-study variation (heterogeneity) that leads to an individually true effect for 
each study. Compared to the fixed effects models, deviations of the average values can be reasoned 
by the integrated random effects among the underlying true effects for each effect size. Deviations 
are especially obvious for TANG (0.024 to 0.048), SIZE (0.021 to 0.038), EVOL (-0.031 to -
0.024), and PROF (-0.030 to -0.062). To analyze the underlying forces driving these deviations 
across studies, we explicitly model the unobserved heterogeneity in the next step via MRA.     
[PLEASE INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
4 Meta-regression analysis 
MRA is used to explain the deviations among the results reported in primary studies for a 
specific capital structure determinant and reveal the relevant factors that cause the heterogeneity. In 
a first step, we calculate the aggregated mean effects and evaluate as well as correct for publication 
selection for various subsamples of reported effect estimates (see for other applications of this 
procedure, among others, Doucouliagos & Laroche, 2009; Havránek & Irsova, 2011; Stanley, 
2004). In a second step, we continue with a multiple regression analysis to explain heterogeneity 
among the reported effect estimates by simultaneously controlling for several study characteristics.    
4.1 FAT-PET model 
As usually applied in MRA, we first test for the existence of selective reporting of certain 
research results. In general, publication selection bias refers to the phenomenon that specific 
estimates are systematically underrepresented in empirical literature (Rosenthal, 1979). In other 
words, publication selection bias exists when researchers prefer statistically significant results 
(Stanley, 2005). If, for example, the majority of literature shares the same preference on the sign 
and significance for a certain determinant following an accepted theory, publication selection might 
cause an over-representation of larger and more significant effects (Card & Krueger, 1995; 
Doucouliagos & Stanley, 2013). One the one hand, the finding of conventionally expected results 
serves as a model selection test (Card & Krueger, 1995). On the other hand, reviewers and editors 
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might favor papers that confirm the conventional view (Card & Krueger, 1995). In the presence of 
publication selection bias, an overall view across the available literature will be distorted. 
Accordingly, primary studies as well as narrative literature reviews would lead to incorrect 
inferences about the true effect and neither are able to meaningfully aggregate existing empirical 
results (Stanley, 2005). Many existing meta-analyses have already shown that publication selection 
bias seriously threatens the integrity of the empirical research process in different areas of research 
(among many others, Doucouliagos, Stanley, & Giles, 2012; Doucouliagos & Stanley, 2009; Feld 
& Heckemeyer, 2011; Goerg & Strobl, 2001; Rusnak, Havránek, & Horváth, 2013). Besides 
publication selection, model misspecification biases might also arise from certain data limitations, 
inappropriate estimation methods, or omitted variables (Stanley, 2001).  
To test for the presence of publication selection bias, we analyze the relation between the 
observed effect sizes and their standard errors. This model can be described as follows: 
 𝑟𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐸(𝑟𝑖𝑗) + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 ,    𝜀𝑖𝑗 ∼ 𝑁(0; 𝑆𝐸(𝑟𝑖𝑗)
2) (4) 
The dependent variable 𝑟𝑖𝑗 is the i-th partial correlation coefficient measuring the relation between 
capital structure and a certain determinant from the j-th study, 𝑆𝐸(𝑟𝑖𝑗) is the standard error of the 
partial correlations, and 𝜀𝑖𝑗 is the error term.  
The t-test of the regression coefficient 𝛽1 in this model quantifies publication selection bias 
(Egger, Smith, Schneider, & Minder, 1997). This test is commonly known as the funnel asymmetry 
test (FAT) (Stanley, 2008). If 𝛽1 = 0, it can be concluded that literature does not suffer from 
publication selection bias as there is no association between the effect size and its precision. Hence, 
the probability of measuring the genuine effect increases with the precision of the estimate and as 
reported effect estimates are normally (symmetrically) distributed around it. If 𝛽1 ≠ 0, there would 
be an overrepresentation of reported results for a certain direction of the effect, indicated by a 
significant relation between the effect size and its precision. The intercept 𝛽0 represents the 
precision effect test (PET), which quantifies the mean effect size for the relation between capital 
structure and the specific determinant beyond potential publication selection bias. Hereinafter, we 
refer to Equation 4 as FAT-PET model. 
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4.2 Multiple meta-regression analysis 
In addition to publication selection bias, deviations in the reported results from primary studies 
might also be driven by measurement differences, regional differences, data characteristics, 
publication characteristics, or differences in model specification. In this manner, the FAT-PET 
model from Equation (4) can be extended to a multiple MRA by including a vector of various study 
characteristics: 
 𝑟𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐸(𝑟𝑖𝑗) + ∑ 𝛾𝑘𝑍𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗 ,    𝜖𝑖𝑗 ∼ 𝑁(0; 𝑆𝐸(𝑟𝑖𝑗)
2), (5) 
where 𝑍𝑖𝑗𝑘 denotes the set of k explanatory variables, and 𝜖𝑖𝑗 is the error term. The FAT remains 
valid for the multiple MRA model as stated in Equation (5). The intercept 𝛽0 still measures the 
mean effect size beyond potential publication selection bias, but must now be interpreted as 
conditional on the values for the 𝑍 vector (Stanley & Doucouliagos, 2012). In this respect, the 𝑍 
vector controls for systematic variation across the effect sizes through several additional 
explanatory variables, thus capturing different aspects of study design. 
4.3 Study characteristics 
Several primary studies already show that the determinants of capital structure might be driven 
by time-, firm-, industry-, and country-specific factors (among others, Anwar & Sun, 2015; Fan, 
Titman, & Twite, 2012; Harris & Raviv, 1991; Jong, Kabir, & Nguyen, 2008; Kayo & Kimura, 
2011). As the majority of primary studies examine certain firm observations, for example, a firm's 
specific industry and/or location during a certain period, such effects might explain a substantial 
part of the within- and between-study variation in existing results. Hence, besides testing the 
existence of publication selection bias, we control for measurement differences, regional 
differences, data characteristics, publication characteristics, and differences in model specification, 
in order to capture fixed effects among the effects sizes. The extracted variables are either directly 
extracted from the primary studies or derived from external databases. The variables are 
summarized in Table 4 including definitions and descriptive statistics.  
 [PLEASE INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
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4.3.1 Measurement differences 
Economic literature presents and discusses several alternate methods to measure capital 
structure, which are assumed to have different behaviors (Harris & Raviv, 1991). In general, capital 
structure can be divided into market versus book leverage, as well as total versus long-term debt 
(among others, Cole, 2013; Feld et al., 2013; Frank & Goyal, 2009). We include two dummy 
variables to capture differences among variable definitions in our analyses. The variable ML refers 
to differences in the measurement of corporate capital structure. As noted by Feld et al. (2013), 
primary studies usually examine market leverage (among others, Bathala, Moon, & Rao, 1994; 
Mittoo & Zhang, 2008), book leverage (among others, Cole, 2013; Johnson, 1997), or both (among 
others, Berger, Ofek, & Yermack, 1997; Faulkender & Petersen, 2006) as a proxy for capital 
structure. Market leverage is especially characterized by its forward-looking property. Although it 
can be negative, book leverage might be preferred as a relatively reliable indicator for corporate 
financial decisions, given the high volatility of financial markets (Frank & Goyal, 2009). Although 
Bowman (1980) finds a large cross-sectional correlation between book and market leverage, 
Barclay, Morellec, and Smith (2006) see no reason for an equal behavior of the two measures. The 
latter conclusion is, for example, supported by Frank and Goyal (2009), whose core set of 
determining factors alters when changing from market to book leverage. Further, TD considers 
differences in debt maturity as the majority of studies examine long-term debt (among others, Kim 
& Sorensen, 1986; Shivdasani & Stefanescu, 2009), total debt (among others, Antoniou, Guney, & 
Paudyal, 2008; Rajan & Zingales, 1995), or both (among others, van Campenhout & van 
Caneghem, 2013; Erol & Tirtiroglu, 2011). Barclay and Smith (1995) state that there is a relation 
between the extent of information asymmetry (as, for example, recently analyzed by Laux, 
Lóránth, & Morrison, 2017) and the choice of debt maturity. Hence, higher asymmetries impede 
the use of long-term debt. Although there is an agreement that the choice of leverage measurement 
should be made on the basis of the analysis’s objective (Rajan & Zingales, 1995), a large portion of 
studies on the determinants of capital structure provides results for several variable definitions 
(among others, Bae, Kang, & Wang, 2011; Hovakimian, Opler, & Titman, 2001; Titman 
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& Wessels, 1988). In these cases, it is the responsibility of the reader to assess whether certain 
results are reliable and which findings to follow. 
4.3.2 Regional differences 
Furthermore, differences in the determinants of capital structure might arise due to cross-
country variations in taxation, corporate governance, development of financial markets, or 
legislation. In order to control for systematic regional differences (among others, Jong et al., 2008; 
Kayo & Kimura, 2011), we add several variables from external databases. The variables are chosen 
on the basis of availability of the underlying comprehensive data set. First, we control for 
differences in economic development. Thus, we include the country-specific (logarithm of) GDP 
per capita (GDP) (Frank & Goyal, 2009) as well as the growth rate in GDP per capita 
(GDPGROW). The former represents the development of a certain country, while the latter relates 
to good growth opportunities for investors (Kayo & Kimura, 2011). Following Carney, Gedajlovic, 
Heugens, van Essen, and van Oosterhout (2011), the variable US addresses the fact that a 
remarkable part of our sample is based on data from US firms. Moreover, differences in the 
determinants of corporate capital structure might also occur due to regulatory differences. Legal 
systems are assumed to form legal rules that can influence financial markets. Hence, civil law 
countries are associated with “greater government intervention in economic activity and weaker 
protection of private property” (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000, p. 12). For 
these reasons, law systems drive the development of financial markets. It can also be shown that 
better shareholder protection induces higher company valuations (Porta, Lopez‐de‐Silanes, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 2002). CIVIL distinguishes between civil law countries and differing law 
systems. Finally, we take potential effects into account, which are caused by the globalization of 
financial markets (among others, Stulz, 1999; Stulz, 2005). Therefore, we include FDI as a proxy 
for globalization (Anwar & Sun, 2015; Dreher, 2006). Among others, Alfaro, Chanda, Kalemli-
Ozcan, and Sayek (2004) show that FDI significantly contributes to economic growth, while the 
development of financial markets plays a moderating role for the realization of these positive 
effects. Corresponding effects might also appear between developed and developing countries 
(Kayo & Kimura, 2011). DEV is included to measure such corresponding differences.  
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4.3.3 Data characteristics 
Moreover, variations in taxation, legislation, and management behavior might also lead to 
industrial or temporal differences regarding capital structure decisions. The data characteristics are 
chosen in line with recent meta studies (among others, Carney et al., 2011; Feld et al., 2013; 
Valickova et al., 2015). MEANYEAR accounts for a potential temporal development in the 
company’s capital structure decision by measuring the age of the observed firm level data (among 
others, Carney et al., 2011; Feld et al., 2013). DATERANGE indicates the time coverage of a study 
(among others, Horváthová, 2010; Perdiguero-García, 2013). Further, FIRMS refers to the 
comprehensiveness of the study by counting the (logarithm of) number of observed firms (among 
others, Valickova et al., 2015). A remarkable amount of primary studies explicitly investigate small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SME). Therefore, SME explains potential differences in capital 
structure decisions caused by firm size. Moreover, CROSS captures variations induced by cross-
sectional analyses in contrast to panel data analyses (among others, Carney et al., 2011; 
Doucouliagos & Ulubasoglu, 2008).  
4.3.4 Publication characteristics 
Among the publication characteristics, we sum up differences in study quality. CITE measures 
the (logarithm of) number of citations (plus 1) and controls effects caused by differences in study 
quality not captured by the other explanatory variables (among others, Havránek, Horváth, Irsova, 
& Rusnak, 2015; Kysucky & Norden, 2015). As this factor takes study-specific quality 
characteristics into account and is available for each study including also unpublished works, it is 
preferred over the journal impact factor. To control potential differences between published and 
unpublished works, we include the dummy variable WP in our analyses (among others, Carney et 
al. 2011).  
4.3.5 Differences in model specification 
A further special capability of MRA is the explicit analysis of differences in model 
specification. Thereby, we capture differences in the complexity of statistical procedures. Further, 
we are able to investigate in detail the impact of single control variables in order to reveal 
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misspecification bias due to ignored controls. OLS and HTRG take differences in model 
specification into account (among others, Feld et al., 2013; Valickova et al., 2015). OLS refers to 
simple ordinary least squares approaches compared to more sophisticated techniques like structural 
equation modeling (among others, Chang, Lee, & Lee, 2009; Yang, Lee, Gu, & Lee, 2010). HTRG 
indicates if a study controls for unobserved heterogeneity by fixed or random effects. To address 
analysis of misspecification bias in primary studies, we include fourteen dummy variables for the 
most frequently employed control variables (TANGDUM, NDTSDUM, GROWDUM, MTBDUM, 
SIZEDUM, EVOLDUM, PROFDUM, AGEDUM, LIQDUM, DIVDUM, TAXDUM, ADDUM, 
RDDUM, and LAGLEVDUM).  
4.4 Model specification 
We estimate the MRA stated in Equations (4) and (5) while taking into account the following 
aspects. First, we apply weighted least squares (WLS) estimations such that the equations are 
multiplied by the inverse of the standard errors 1/SE(rij) (precision). This weighting consequently 
transforms the dependent variable into a t-statistic. This procedure is motivated by the fact that the 
standard errors of the reported estimates integrated in the models as explanatory variables usually 
have great variation across primary studies, which leads to heteroskedasticity. Consequently, we 
now assign larger weights to studies reporting lower standard errors and thus obtain more precise 
results (Hedges & Olkin, 1985). This procedure is in line with recent MRA research (Nelson 
& Kennedy, 2009; Stanley & Doucouliagos, 2015).  
Second, another important issue is the handling of dependencies among the effect sizes, which 
arises from the fact that we include multiple estimates from the same study. To consider 
dependencies arising from the integration of all collected effect sizes, we use the cluster-robust 
variance estimation as proposed by Hedges, Tipton, and Johnson (2010). It neither requires an 
assumption about the specific form of sampling distribution nor knowledge of the covariance 




To test robustness, we alternatively apply a mixed-effects multilevel model (Raudenbush, 
Cooper, & Hedges, 1994). This procedure specifically accounts for within-study data dependencies 
if a single study reports multiple estimates based on data from the same country. Since results from 
the FAT-PET model and the multiple meta-regression model do not fundamentally differ from the 
MRA models using cluster-robust standard errors, we do not report them in this study. 
5 Results of the meta-regression analysis 
Our results are based on two different specifications of the MRA model. First, we apply a 
hierarchical subgroup analysis using the simple FAT-PET model following Equation 4. Second, we 
estimate the extended multiple MRA in the form of Equation 5 to explain heterogeneity of the 
reported results beyond publication selection bias.  
5.1 Hierarchical subgroup analysis 
We start the meta-analysis by examining the aggregated mean effects while testing for 
publication selection bias. To obtain a first impression about the presence of publication selection 
bias, we apply a graphical investigation via funnel plots. Therein, the effect sizes (partial 
correlations r) are plotted against their precision (1/SE(r)). As an example, Figure 1 shows the 
funnel plot of the effect sizes measuring the relation between capital structure and profitability. An 
unbiased sample should lead to a symmetric-inverted funnel, indicating that the deviations of the 
single effect sizes from their mean value decrease with an increasing precision of their estimation. 
Figure 1 tends to reject this hypothesis, as effect sizes are systematically underrepresented on the 
right side of the graph. Hence, researchers tend to favor reporting negative effects for the relation 
between capital structure and profitability. As this finding is a first indicator of the existence of 
publication selection bias in the field of determinants of capital structure, we thus proceed with 
statistical analysis. The funnel plots for all seven analyzed determinants can be found in Appendix 
F. 
[PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
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For the statistical analysis, we perform a hierarchical subgroup analysis (among others, 
Bhaskar-Shrinivas et al., 2005; Geyskens, Krishnan, Steenkamp, Jan-Benedict E. M., & Cunha, 
2009) using the simple FAT-PET model following Equation (4), in order to measure the aggregated 
mean effects captured by the PET and to make statistical inferences about potential publication 
selection bias measured by the FAT. Following the univariate analyses by Carney et al. (2011), we 
build subgroups using two criteria for differences in capital structure measurement as well as study 
quality. The differences in capital structure measurement are analyzed by splitting the measurement 
of capital structure (DR) into market leverage (ML), book leverage (BL), total debt (TD), and long-
term debt (LTD). For analysis of study quality, we split our sample into reported results from top 
articles and from randomly selected articles. Table 5 sums up the regression results for the various 
subgroups (subgroup number 1 to 15). 
[PLEASE INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
According to the estimated mean effects corrected for publication selection bias in form of the 
PET, the variables TANG (positive sign), MTB (negative sign), and PROF (negative sign) are the 
most determining firm characteristics that influence corporate capital structure. Across the different 
subgroups, a significant mean effect is observable for TANG (subgroup number 2, 7, and 10) as 
well as for PROF (subgroup number 2, 4, 8, and 10), and for MTB (subgroup number 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 
and 10). Hence, for these three variables we confirm the findings of the seminal studies by Frank 
and Goyal (2009), Harris and Raviv (1991), and Rajan and Zingales (1995). A comparison of the 
magnitudes of these significant mean effects indicates that TANG has the strongest economic 
effect on leverage, followed by MTB and PROF. With a consistently positive sign, the results for 
TANG indicate an increasing leverage for firms that have more tangible assets. The observed 
statistically significant coefficients range from 0.052 through 0.074 as displayed in Table 5. This 
positive effect can be explained by the tradeoff theory, as tangible assets decrease the costs of 
financial distress due to easier valuation by outsiders (Frank & Goyal, 2009). Further, the negative 
sign of the MTB variable, with statistically significant coefficients between -0.028 and -0.046, 
indicates that those firms provided with a large amount of profitable investment opportunities 
should focus on equity financing (Myers, 1977), since high market-to-book ratios seem to coincide 
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with lower leverage ratios (Wu & Yeung, 2012). Following market timing theory in terms of 
market misvaluation, firms exploit equity mispricing through equity issuances when market-to-
book ratios are high (Frank & Goyal, 2009). Alternatively, the negative relation might be explained 
through persistent financing policies (Chen & Zhao, 2004), although these conclusions are not 
undisputed (Mahajan & Tartaroglu, 2008). Our finding for MTB might be accounted for by the 
dynamic tradeoff model (such as, Kayhan & Titman, 2007) as MTB also captures persistent future 
growth opportunities (Hovakimian, 2006). Finally, PROF with a negative sign and statistically 
significant coefficients ranging from -0.026 to -0.028 (please refer to Table 5) can be justified by 
the pecking-order theory (Myers & Majluf, 1984). More profitable firms tend to finance their 
projects internally, leading to a lower leverage ratio. Also, the dynamic tradeoff model supports 
this view by arguing that firms passively accumulate profits. Our result for profitability supports 
the finding by Titman and Wessels (1988), who state a significant relationship exists only for 
market leverage, but not for book leverage. This implies that firms do not take advantage of 
increased market leverage due to increased profitability by increasing debt financing, which 
illustrates the dominance of transaction costs. However, firms increase debt financing to the degree 
as book value of equity increases due to increased profitability. Overall, empirical evidence 
supports the view that firms seem to adjust their capital structure according to book values. This 
can be explained by the fact that we obtain primarily insignificant results when solely looking at 
book leverage as a proxy for capital structure. 
Continuing with the results from the FAT, a significant publication selection bias is surprisingly 
striking for the above-mentioned core factors MTB (subgroup number 3 and 10) and PROF 
(subgroup number 2, 4, 8, and 10). This finding supports the underlying assumption that 
researchers tend to overstate their results to align with existing theory and/or influential empirical 
literature. This becomes apparent as the sign of the FAT always shows in the direction of the mean 
effect identified by the PET.  
Differences for the PET and FAT also occur in terms of study quality. In detail, results differ 
between the subgroups based on top articles (subgroup number 8 to 11) and randomly selected 
articles (subgroup number 12 to 15). As apparent from the PET, top articles share a rather common 
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true effect size for TANG, MTB, and PROF indicated by significant coefficients in our MRA 
(subgroup number 8 and 10). Hence, top articles seem to be more uniform in terms of their research 
design. In comparison, none of the sub-samples of randomly selected articles yields a significant 
mean value for any of the investigated determinants, corroborated by the fact that a huge amount of 
heterogeneity in the results comes from randomly selected primary studies of a relatively lower 
quality. Continuing with the results from FAT, significant publication selection bias tends to be 
slightly more severe in top articles (subgroup number 8 and 10). This finding might indicate the 
tendency of internationally accepted journals to require a study to be in line with accepted literature 
and theory, as differing results are assumed to be less reliable (Card & Krueger, 1995). 
Comparing the results from PET and FAT between different measures of capital structure, our 
findings show remarkable deviations between market (subgroup number 4, 8, and 12) and book 
measures (subgroup number 5, 9, and 13) of leverage. Here, we see a clear tendency that reported 
results based on market leverage share a common mean effect for TANG, MTB, and PROF but 
they also suffer more from publication selection. The latter might especially be explained by an 
additional degree of freedom in the form of the market component in the market leverage ratio, 
which accounts for future growth opportunities of a firm. This finding allows us to judge leverage 
based on book values of leverage as a more reliable proxy variable for capital structure, as used by, 
among others, Bhagat, Bolton, and Subramanian (2011), Hovakimian (2006), Lin, Phillips, and 
Smith (2008), Rajan and Zingales (1995). Between total debt (subgroup number 6, 10, and 14) and 
long-term debt (subgroup number 7, 11, and 15) the picture seems to be analogous. Studies using 
total debt measures tend to report more consistent effects, thus leading to significant mean effects. 
Furthermore, publication selection bias tends to be more severe for total debt measures including 
long-term and short-term debt. 
5.2 Multiple meta-regression analysis 
In the following, we additionally control for systematic differences between effect sizes by 
extending the FAT-PET-WLS model by 32 additional explanatory factors. The results shown in 
Table 6 are based on Equation (5). With the chosen model specification the goodness-of-fit 
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measure (adj. 𝑅²) ranges from 0.28 to 0.79 with a remarkable mean value of 0.46. Thus, we are 
able to explain a substantial part of the heterogeneity of reported results from empirical primary 
studies. In the following, the results for the explanatory variables are discussed specifically in terms 
of their effect on amplifying or diminishing influence on the empirical direction of the aggregated 
effects for the determinants of capital structure. 
[PLEASE INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
Regarding the results displayed in Table 6, it is worth noting that the significant publication 
selection bias measured by SE(rij) is diminished when controlling for the additional explanatory 
variables. Hence, we can argue that the selection of statistical results is especially driven by the 
analyzed measurement differences, regional differences, data characteristics, and differences in 
model specification. A significant regression coefficient of SE(rij) (FAT) only remains for NDTS 
(β = 0.8576) and PROF (β = -0.7859).  
Moreover, we again confirm significant differences among the definitions of leverage. The 
usage of market leverage leads to significantly different results compared to book leverage for 
TANG (β = 0.0378), MTB (β = -0.0263), and PROF (β = 0.0186). For TANG and MTB, the usage 
of a market measure amplifies the effect between capital structure and the determinant in the 
direction of an overall positive mean effect for TANG and negative mean effect for MTB, 
respectively. Hence, our findings reject the result from Bowman (1980) in the case of the 
determinants of capital structure, which in general assumes a highly correlated behavior between 
book and market values of leverage. In the same way, the usage of total debt leads to significant 
deviations from long-term debt for TANG (β = -0.0570), NDTS (β = 0.0530), GROW (β = 0.0839), 
SIZE (β = -0.0221), and PROF (β = -0.0700). This result corresponds to the findings from Barclay 
and Smith (1995), who propose an impact of information asymmetry on debt maturity choice. This 
justifies differing results for the determinants of capital structure depending on debt maturity. 
Remarkably, results for the variable TD show that application of a long-term debt measure 
(excluding short term debt) always drives the results for the determinants of capital structure in the 
direction of the aggregated mean effects calculated in our study, except for PROF. 
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Among the studied regional effects, we only find limited evidence of an impact on the 
determinants of capital structure. In fact, we observe a significant impact of GDPGROW on TANG 
(β = -0.1211) and SIZE (β = -0.0766), of the US dummy on MTB (β = -0.0312), and of the CIVIL 
dummy on NDTS (β = -0.0353) and SIZE (β = -0.0249). Consequently, we were not able to 
confirm the finding from Anwar and Sun (2015) who state that foreign presence alters leverage. 
Both FDI and DEV do not show any impact on the determinants of capital structure, at least at the 
5% level. 
We only find limited evidence for the analyzed data characteristics. The results for 
DATERANGE imply that studies using a longer observation period, on average, report lower 
effects for TANG (β = -0.027) and SIZE (β = -0.0218). The same statement can be made for an 
increasing number of firms (FIRMS) in terms of NDTS (β = 0.0127) and MTB (β = 0.0149). 
CROSS shows that cross-sectional studies tend to report a diminished effect for GROW (β = 
0.1403) but an amplified effect for EVOL (β = -0.0439) and PROF (β = -0.0395). 
From the publication characteristics, we learn that the impact of study quality remains for MTB 
and SIZE even when controlling for regional effects, data characteristics, and differences in model 
specification. In fact, we find a statistically significant impact of the number of citations (CITE) on 
the reported results in primary studies for MTB (β = -0.0098) and SIZE (β = -0.0092).  
Among the methodological differences, HTRG shows that studies controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity report significantly deviating results. HTRG confirms that studies integrating 
unobserved heterogeneity in their analysis, on average, tend to report diminished estimated effects 
for EVOL (β = 0.0172) and PROF (β = 0.0315). Further, the results show that inclusion of control 
variables is especially important when analyzing the determinants SIZE, EVOL, and PROF. In 
these cases, several control variables show statistically significant coefficients.  
For the multiple MRA model we do not interpret the results of the intercept in terms of a PET, 
due to the fact that no single mean value exists anymore. Rather, the mean value would have to be 
interpreted with regard to the explanatory variables. Hence, a wide range of mean values would be 




We aggregate existing mixed empirical evidence on the determinants of capital structure to 
explore the variation among results via MRA. Based on a sample of 3,890 reported results from 
100 primary studies, our analysis allows the following five main conclusions. First, our results 
confirm that (in descending order) tangible assets (positive sign), market-to-book ratio (negative 
sign), and profitability (negative sign) significantly explain corporate capital structure. This implies 
three inferences: (1) Tangible assets significantly decrease the costs of financial distress due to the 
easier valuation by outsiders, which provides advantages to external financing. (2) Firms that are 
provided with a large amount of profitable investment opportunities should focus on equity 
financing to be able to exploit all opportunities. (3) More profitable firms should prefer internal 
financing for their projects in favor of a lower leverage ratio. Second, while studying heterogeneity 
we show that deviations from these mean effects are significantly driven by publication selection 
bias. Thus, specific results are systematically overrepresented, as authors prefer reporting 
statistically significant estimates in line with accepted theory and/or previous empirical research. 
Significant determinants as well as publication selection bias are more pronounced for 
characteristics like market-based measures of capital structure or total debt measures of capital 
structure or for top articles from highly renowned journals, as compared to book-based measures of 
capital structure or long-term debt measures of capital structure or randomly selected articles 
including more unknown and unpublished studies. 
Overall, our findings leave some ambiguities and open issues for future research. The results for 
the determinants of capital structure do not seem to follow one single theory. Although each of 
them sounds plausible on its own, it would seem that the time has come to investigate new ideas in 
empirical research and recognize the constraints and tacit objectives caused by following accepted 
theories. Furthermore, researchers should be aware of former studies but stick to the facts and 
results produced by their own studies. Hence, we highly encourage researchers to provide 
independent analyses in order to allow further developments in the field of the determinants of 
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capital structure. As noted by (Stanley, 2001, p. 147), we emphasize that “economic science cannot 




Figure 1: Funnel plot of the effect sizes measuring the relation between debt ratio (DR) and 
profitability (PROF) 
 
This figure shows the funnel plot for the effect between debt ratio (DR) and profitability (PROF). The effect sizes (partial correlation 
coefficients) are plotted against their precision (inverse standard error). The dashed line represents the random effects mean (-0.062) as 




Table 1: Determinants of corporate capital structure 
Variable  Tradeoff theory Pecking-order theory Market timing theory 
Asset tangibility + +/-  
Non-debt tax shield  -   
Firm growth - +  
Growth opportunities - - - 
Firm size + -  
Earnings volatility - +  
Profitability + -  
This table sums up the proxy variables used in empirical literature to explain capital structure decisions. “+”, “-“, and “?” indicate a positive, 




Table 2: Definitions of the analyzed variables 
Variable  Abbreviation Definition Number of extracted 
effect sizes referring to a 
certain proxy variable 
Measures of capital structure1 
Debt ratio DR Book value of total debt or long-term debt scaled by market or 
book value of the firm, market, or book value of equity 
respectively 
1,041 
Market leverage ML DR where equity is measured in terms of market value in the 
denominator 
329 
Book leverage BL DR where equity is measured in terms of book value in the 
denominator 
712 
Total debt TD DR where total debt is used to measure the amount of external 
capital in the nominator 
705 
Long-term debt LTD DR where long-term debt is used to measure the amount of 
external capital in the nominator 
337 
Determinants of capital structure² 
Asset tangibility TANG Tangible assets (scaled) 787 
Non-debt tax shield  NDTS Depreciation plus amortization (plus investment tax credits and 
tax-loss carryforwards) (scaled) 
Alternatively: earnings before interest and taxes minus tax 
payments (scaled) 
299 
Firm growth GROW Yearly turnover growth (scaled) 319 
Growth opportunities MTB (Logarithm of) market value of assets (equity) to book value of 
assets (equity) 
476 
Firm size SIZE (Logarithm of) total assets, sales, or employees, respectively 910 
Earnings volatility EVOL Standard deviation of earnings before interest and taxes, return 
on assets, respectively 
308 
Profitability PROF Earnings before interest and taxes (scaled) 791 
This table lists the proxy variables reviewed in this paper. Beside variable name and abbreviation, the variable definitions used in primary 
studies are given in the third column. The last column shows the number of effect sizes measuring the relation between each proxy variable and 
debt ratio found in the sample of primary studies as used for the MRA calculations. 
1 The number of extracted effect sizes is calculated based on the number of regression equations in primary studies, where the specific DR 
measure is used as dependent variable, independent of the analyzed determinants. 
² The number of extracted effect sizes is calculated based on the number of regression equations in primary studies, where the specific 





Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
Determinant of 















































This table lists the descriptive statistics for effect sizes measuring the relation between capital structure and a certain determinant. r stands for 





Table 4: Study characteristics 
Variable  Description Mean SD 
Measurement differences 
ML = 1 if market leverage is used to calculate corporate capital structure, 0 otherwise 0.316 0.465 
BL = 1 if book leverage is used to calculate corporate capital structure, 0 otherwise 0.684 0.465 
TD = 1 if total debt is used to calculate corporate capital structure, 0 otherwise 0.677 0.468 
Regional differences 
GDP Logarithm of mean value of GDP per capita scaled by 1000 across the observed time period for 
the respective country1 
2.481 1.395 
GDPGROW Mean growth rate of GDP per capita across the observed time period for the respective country1 0.059 0.047 
US = 1 if US firms are analyzed, 0 otherwise 0.343 0.475 
CIVIL = 1 if a country has a civil law system, 0 otherwise² 0.414 0.493 
FDI Logarithm of mean value of foreign direct investment (FDI) across the observed time period 
for the respective country1 
0.550 0.981 
DEV = 1 if a country is classified as a developing country, 0 otherwise³ 0.264 0.441 
Data characteristics 
MEANYEAR Logarithm of mean observation year of firm data used in a primary study less 1950 3.842 0.221 
DATERANGE Logarithm of number of observed years  2.119 0.859 
FIRMS Logarithm of number of observed firms  6.239 1.817 
SME = 1 if only small and medium sized enterprises are analyzed, 0 otherwise 0.141 0.348 
CROSS = 1 if cross-sectional data are analyzed, 0 otherwise 0.811 0.391 
Publication characteristics 
CITE Logarithm of number of citations plus 1 on Google Scholar as of April 27, 2016  4.026 1.956 
WP = 1 if the respective study is not published in a scientific journal yet, 0 otherwise 0.060 0.238 
Differences in model specification 
OLS = 1 if the study applies a simple ordinary least squares regression, 0 otherwise 0.455 0.498 
HTRG = 1 if the study controls for unobserved heterogeneity in the statistical approach through fixed 
or random effects, 0 otherwise 
0.115 0.320 
TANGDUM = 1 if the study controls for tangible assets in the regression analysis, 0 otherwise 0.714 0.452 
NDTSDUM = 1 if the study controls for non-debt tax shield in the regression analysis, 0 otherwise 0.280 0.449 
GROWDUM = 1 if the study controls for firm growth in the regression analysis, 0 otherwise 0.344 0.475 
MTBDUM = 1 if the study controls for growth opportunities of a firm in the regression analysis, 0 
otherwise 
0.375 0.484 
SIZEDUM = 1 if the study controls for firm size in the regression analysis, 0 otherwise 0.839 0.368 
EVOLDUM = 1 if the study controls for earnings volatility in the regression analysis, 0 otherwise 0.293 0.455 
PROFDUM = 1 if the study controls for profitability in the regression analysis, 0 otherwise 0.729 0.445 
AGEDUM = 1 if the study controls for firm age in the regression analysis, 0 otherwise 0.214 0.410 
LIQDUM = 1 if the study controls for liquidity in the regression analysis, 0 otherwise 0.214 0.410 
DIVDUM = 1 if the study controls for dividend yield in the regression analysis, 0 otherwise 0.097 0.296 
TAXDUM = 1 if the study controls for corporate tax rate in the regression analysis, 0 otherwise 0.152 0.359 
ADDUM = 1 if the study controls for advertising intensity in the regression analysis, 0 otherwise 0.074 0.262 
RDDUM = 1 if the study controls for research and development intensity in the regression analysis, 0 
otherwise 
0.138 0.345 
LAGLEVDUM = 1 if the study includes a lagged variable of leverage in the regression analysis, 0 otherwise 0.129 0.335 
This table presents the explanatory variables employed in the MRA. Beside the abbreviation of the variable name, a short description is given in 
the second column. The last two columns show the mean value and the sample standard deviation (SD) for the particular variable. The data are 
calculated based on the sample of 100 studies.  
1  The data are drawn from the World Bank: http://data.worldbank.org/ 
²  The data are drawn from The World Factbook: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2100.html  
³  Data for this classification is taken from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD):  




Table 5: Results of the FAT-PET models 
Subsample according 
to study quality 





to capital structure 
measure 
DR DR DR ML BL TD LTD 
Subgroup number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Regression coefficient FAT (𝜷?̂?)  PET (𝜷?̂?) FAT (𝜷?̂?)  PET (𝜷?̂?) FAT (𝜷?̂?)  PET (𝜷?̂?) FAT (𝜷?̂?)  PET (𝜷?̂?) FAT (𝜷?̂?)  PET (𝜷?̂?) FAT (𝜷?̂?)  PET (𝜷?̂?) FAT (𝜷?̂?)  PET (𝜷?̂?) 
TANG 0.111 0.038 0.119 0.053** 0.231 0.001 0.173 0.070* 0.102 0.017 -0.067 0.035 0.162 0.074** 
 (0.330) (0.027) (0.383) (0.018) (0.239) (0.011) (0.425) (0.024) (0.334) (0.026) (0.385) (0.032) (0.343) (0.024) 
NDTS 0.133 -0.006 -0.674* 0.018 0.425 -0.026 -0.385 0.010 0.230 -0.009 0.497 -0.011 -0.045 -0.028 
 (0.236) (0.01) (0.225) (0.01) (0.246) (0.009) (0.241) (0.008) (0.239) (0.009) (0.281) (0.010) (0.163) (0.013) 
GROW 0.459 0.016 -0.3151 -0.021 0.822 0.023 -0.571 -0.016 0.704 0.023 0.590 0.009 0.135 0.030 
 (0.794) (0.054) (0.351) (0.023) (1.132) (0.074) (0.539) (0.018) (1.034) (0.071) (1.052) (0.061) (0.346) (0.049) 
MTB -0.007 -0.039* -0.184   -0.037*** 0.962** -0.046* -0.263 -0.044** 0.189 -0.030** -0.149 -0.038** 0.127 -0.030 
 (0.110) (0.006) (0.127) (0.007) (0.169) (0.015) (0.156) (0.009) (0.193) (0.009) (0.251) (0.008) (0.213) (0.013) 
SIZE 0.518* 0.016 0.520 0.015 0.512 0.017 0.841 0.012 0.373 0.017 0.546 0.011 0.245 0.047* 
 (0.165) (0.013) (0.371) (0.034) (0.422) (0.018) (0.444) (0.031) (0.141) (0.010) (0.194) (0.014) (0.188) (0.019) 
EVOL 0.138 -0.032 0.186 -0.037 -0.015 -0.014 0.423 -0.054 -0.063 -0.014 0.243 -0.034 -0.114 -0.023 
 (0.251) (0.021) (0.370) (0.030) (0.283) (0.017) (0.534) (0.039) (0.273) (0.023) (0.331) (0.028) (0.305) (0.014) 
PROF -0.438 -0.037 -0.483** -0.028** -0.341 -0.054 -0.474** -0.026** -0.415 -0.044 -0.587 -0.035 -0.200 -0.035 





Table 5: continued 
Subsample according 
to study quality 
Top articles Randomly selected articles 
Subsample according 
to capital structure 
measure 
ML BL TD LTD ML BL TD LTD 
Subgroup number 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Regression coefficient FAT (𝜷?̂?)  PET (𝜷?̂?) FAT (𝜷?̂?)  PET (𝜷?̂?) FAT (𝜷?̂?)  PET (𝜷?̂?) FAT (𝜷?̂?)  PET (𝜷?̂?) FAT (𝜷?̂?)  PET (𝜷?̂?) FAT (𝜷?̂?)  PET (𝜷?̂?) FAT (𝜷?̂?)  PET (𝜷?̂?) FAT (𝜷?̂?)  PET (𝜷?̂?) 
TANG 0.196 0.068* -0.012 0.037 -0.017 0.052** 0.204 0.074 -1.406 0.157 0.232 -0.007 0.008 -0.011 0.126 0.073 
 (0.440) (0.025) (0.464) (0.024) (0.452) (0.021) (0.728) (0.038) (12.718) (0.075) (0.232) (0.007) (0.396) (0.015) (0.459) (0.032) 
NDTS -0.700 0.018 -0.627 0.018 -0.124 0.009 -1.931 0.060 -0.112 0.008 0.490 -0.032 0.917 -0.041 -0.025 -0.019 
 (0.387) (0.016) (0.352) (0.017) (0.156) (0.007) (0.419) (0.021) (0.222) (0.016) (0.280) (0.010) (0.386) (0.018) (0.210) (0.035) 
GROW -0.498 -0.024 0.169 -0.031 -0.294 -0.022 -4.335*** 0.214*** -27.197 0.074 0.782 0.032 12.118 0.012 0.170 0.032 
 (0.472) (0.015) (1.636) (0.102) (0.364) (0.025) (0.000) (0.000) (13.235) (0.051) (11.122) (0.073) (1.764) (0.105) (0.332) (0.047) 
MTB -0.361* -0.043** -0.008 -0.028* -0.476** -0.034*** 0.104 -0.031 14.042 -0.076 0.451 0.005 10.168** -0.054 17.031** -0.060 
 (0.128) (0.009) (0.258) (0.010) (0.146) (0.008) (0.285) (0.018) (0.992) (0.062) (0.175) (0.009) (0.191) (0.026) (0.117) (0.040) 
SIZE 0.843 0.006 0.139 0.026 0.505 0.012 0.385 0.037 -0.287 0.122 0.506 0.011 0.594 0.009 0.048 0.063 
 (0.444) (0.031) (0.410) (0.030) (0.335) (0.024) (0.181) (0.020) (0.733) (0.054) (0.407) (0.015) (0.515) (0.018) (0.373) (0.046) 
EVOL 0.580 -0.067 -0.481 -0.003 0.162 -0.037 0.533 -0.048 -0.691 0.017 0.104 -0.024 0.094 -0.004 -0.161 -0.023 
 (0.607) (0.041) (0.502) (0.024) (0.368) (0.032) (0.415) (0.018) (0.479) (0.014) (0.297) (0.021) (0.488) (0.034) (0.372) (0.018) 
PROF -0.459** -0.026** -0.524 -0.029* -0.708** -0.026** -0.135 -0.018 -0.785 -0.009 -0.336 -0.056 -0.405 -0.052 -0.194 -0.061 
 (0.160) (0.008) (0.330) (0.011) (0.213) (0.008) (0.238) (0.025) (0.424) (0.036) (0.438) (0.043) (0.578) (0.046) (0.266) (0.04) 
The table sums up the regression coefficients from the FAT-PET-WLS model using weighted least squares estimation as described in Equation (4):  
𝑟𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐸(𝑟𝑖𝑗) + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 ,    𝜀𝑖𝑗 ∼ 𝑁(0; 𝑆𝐸(𝑟𝑖𝑗)
2) 
The t-test of the regression coefficient 𝛽1 in this model serves as a funnel asymmetry test (FAT) to detect publication selection bias. The intercept 𝛽0 quantifies the mean effect size for the relation between capital structure 
and a certain determinant beyond potential publication selection bias in the form of a precision effect test (PET). In each regression model, the dependent variable is the effect size (partial correlation r) measuring the 
relation between a certain measure of capital structure (DR, ML, BL, TD, or LTD) and a certain determinant (TANG, NDTS, GROW, MTB, SIZE, EVOL, or PROF). The model considers data dependencies at the study 
level by cluster-robust errors and uses the inverse standard errors as weights. The standard deviations are displayed in parentheses. 




Table 6: Results of the multiple MRA 
Determinant TANG NDTS GROW MTB SIZE EVOL PROF 
Emp. sign + - - - + - - 
 Intercept 0.3426 -0.1796*** -0.3743** -0.0969 0.3529* -0.0211 -0.1422 
  (1.53) (-3.47) (-2.48) (-0.61) (1.90) (-0.13) (-0.54) 
FAT SE(rij) 0.2776 0.8576** 1.1085 0.4037 0.2277 0.0372 -0.7859*** 
  (1.25) (2.23) (1.26) (0.95) (1.09) (0.22) (-3.59) 
1 ML 0.0378*** -0.0061 -0.0367 -0.0263** 0.0093 0.0031 0.0186** 
  (2.74) (-1.19) (-1.42) (-2.34) (1.19) (0.32) (2.04) 
 TD -0.0570** 0.0530*** 0.0839*** -0.0209 -0.0221** 0.0098 -0.0700** 
  (-2.45) (3.38) (3.70) (-1.51) (-2.21) (0.61) (-2.05) 
2 GDP 0.0011 0.0100* 0.0120 -0.0008 -0.0048 -0.0004 -0.0077 
  (0.24) (1.72) (1.44) (-0.16) (-1.17) (-0.10) (-1.20) 
 GDPGROW -0.1211** 0.0086 m -0.0079 0.0766*** m -0.0080 
  (-2.08) (0.31)  (-0.37) (3.85)  (-0.15) 
 US -0.0036 0.0031 -0.0024 -0.0312** 0.0002 -0.0024 0.0291 
  (-0.24) (0.35) (-0.07) (-2.32) (0.01) (-0.26) (1.33) 
 CIVIL -0.0166 -0.0353** 0.0075 -0.0132 0.0249** 0.0173 -0.0117 
  (-0.91) (-2.27) (0.19) (-0.78) (2.11) (1.07) (-0.81) 
 FDI -0.0099 -0.0028 -0.0158* -0.0055 0.0007 0.0004 0.0041 
  (-1.56) (-0.72) (-1.96) (-1.33) (0.14) (0.09) (0.58) 
 DEV -0.0091 0.0120 -0.0187 -0.0132 0.0036 0.0025 -0.0074 
  (-1.23) (1.15) (-1.17) (-1.68) (0.45) (0.75) (-1.31) 
3 MEANYEAR -0.0630 m m 0.0024 -0.0590 -0.0063 0.0433 
  (-1.21)   (0.09) (-1.44) (-0.15) (0.78) 
 DATERANGE -0.0277* -0.0064 0.0063 0.0078 -0.0218** 0.0030 0.0093 
  (-1.82) (-0.62) (0.23) (1.66) (-2.18) (0.34) (1.05) 
 FIRMS m 0.0127*** -0.0000 0.0149** m 0.0006 m 
   (2.81) (-0.00) (2.19)  (0.23)  
 SME 0.0014 -0.0095 0.0069 -0.0416 -0.0013 0.0174 -0.0091 
  (0.19) (-0.65) (0.35) (-1.43) (-0.30) (1.14) (-1.19) 
 CROSS 0.0165 0.0053 0.1403** 0.0104 0.0177 -0.0439*** -0.0395** 
  (0.98) (0.33) (2.68) (0.66) (1.33) (-2.80) (-2.12) 
4 WP m -0.0158 -0.0020 m 0.0166 -0.0165 m 
   (-0.53) (-0.04)  (0.59) (-0.85)  
 CITE 0.0063 m -0.0016 -0.0098*** -0.0092*** m 0.0066* 
  (1.63)  (-0.12) (-3.71) (-3.16)  (1.96) 
5 OLS 0.0278** -0.0042 0.0342 0.0174 -0.0206 0.0041* 0.0099 
  (2.13) (-1.03) (0.92) (1.34) (-1.41) (1.89) (0.93) 
 HTRG -0.0108 0.0193 -0.0126 0.0286* 0.0269* 0.0172*** 0.0315** 
  (-0.74) (1.52) (-0.70) (1.77) (1.66) (2.75) (2.61) 
 TANGDUM  0.0002 0.0339 -0.0172 -0.0382* -0.0141 -0.0078 
   (0.02) (1.19) (-0.52) (-1.71) (-1.22) (-0.33) 
 NDTSDUM -0.0067  -0.0496 -0.0344* 0.0336*** 0.0157** 0.0238 
  (-0.40)  (-1.64) (-1.69) (2.74) (2.15) (1.49) 
 GROWDUM -0.0034 0.0195  0.0479* 0.0241 0.0488** -0.1049*** 
  (-0.14) (0.77)  (1.76) (1.64) (2.26) (-3.00) 
 MTBDUM 0.0454* 0.0313 -0.0750  0.0662** 0.0407** -0.0187 
  (1.83) (1.63) (-1.41)  (2.50) (2.71) (-0.95) 
 SIZEDUM -0.0245 -0.0197 0.0983* m  0.0172 -0.0002 
  (-0.98) (-0.93) (1.96)   (0.79) (-0.01) 
 EVOLDUM 0.0019 0.0087 -0.0020 0.0015 0.0381**  -0.0075 
  (0.17) (0.77) (-0.07) (0.09) (2.31)  (-0.82) 
 PROFDUM -0.0061 m 0.0947** 0.0181 0.0052 -0.0073  
  (-0.24)  (2.18) (0.48) (0.29) (-0.33)  
 AGEDUM -0.0235 m 0.0252 -0.0057 -0.0757*** -0.0335** 0.0209 
  (-1.13)  (0.64) (-0.25) (-5.27) (-2.37) (1.03) 
 LIQDUM 0.0183 0.0156 -0.1131*** 0.0758 -0.0342** -0.0244 0.0888** 
  (1.24) (0.62) (-2.72) (1.14) (-2.13) (-1.01) (2.41) 
 DIVDUM -0.0504** 0.0070 0.0866 0.0006 -0.0136 0.0124 -0.0293* 
  (-2.18) (0.23) (1.00) (0.03) (-1.06) (0.50) (-1.94) 
 TAXDUM -0.0047 0.0134 -0.0416 -0.0869 -0.0475* 0.0045 0.0602*** 
  (-0.25) (0.76) (-1.14) (-1.67) (-1.91) (0.35) (2.65) 
 ADDUM -0.0019 -0.0210 m 0.0274 -0.0164 m -0.0048 
  (-0.07) (-1.39)  (0.98) (-0.68)  (-0.15) 
 RDDUM -0.0109 -0.0036 0.1463*** -0.0111 -0.0343*** -0.0364*** -0.0156 
  (-0.47) (-0.18) (3.10) (-0.58) (-2.74) (-2.74) (-0.71) 
 LAGLEVDUM -0.0050 -0.0277 0.0344 0.0486 -0.0001 -0.0026 0.0183 
  (-0.38) (-1.54) (1.01) (1.64) (-0.01) (-0.33) (1.07) 
Adj. R² 0.55 0.28 0.46 0.34 0.43 0.79 0.40 
35 
 
Observations 774 299 311 472 895 298 785 
This table presents the results of the extended MRA model with cluster-robust errors as described in Equation (5):  
𝑟𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐸(𝑟𝑖𝑗) + ∑ 𝛾𝑘𝑍𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗 ,    𝜖𝑖𝑗 ∼ 𝑁(0; 𝑆𝐸(𝑟𝑖𝑗)
2) 
In addition to the funnel asymmetry test (FAT) by SE(rij), extension of the regression model by several study characteristics in the 
form of the additional Z-vector allows a more detailed analysis of the heterogeneity of the dependent variable. In each regression, the 
dependent variable is the effect size (partial correlation r) measuring the relation between capital structure and a certain determinant 
(TANG, NDTS, GROW, MTB, SIZE, EVOL, or PROF). In addition to measurement differences and the funnel asymmetry test 
(FAT), the regression models include several study characteristics, which control for (1) measurement differences, (2) regional 
differences, (3) data characteristics, (4) publication characteristics, and (5) differences in model specification. The corresponding 
explanatory variables are separated by horizontal lines. t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  
Statistically significant values are displayed in bold: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Appendix A: Reporting guidelines for meta-regression research 
 Guidelines by Stanley et al. (2013) This study 
  
Research question 
1 Clear statement of the specific economic 
theories, hypotheses, or effects studied  
The relevant theoretical background for the determinants of 
corporate capital structure is stated in section 2, followed by the 
theory of the analyzed moderating effects in section 4.4. 
2 Precise definition of how effects are 
measured (the ‘effect size’) and explicit 
description of how measured effects are 
comparable 
Section 3.2 includes the discussion and derivation of the partial 
correlation coefficients used as effect sizes in this study. 
Appendix E shows the relevant formulas for their calculation. 
Table 2 sums up the aggregated definitions of the variables of 
interest. Moreover, Section 4.4.1 explicitly refers to differences 
in variable definitions, captured as explanatory variables in order 
to make the effect sizes even more comparable. 
Research literature searching, compilation and coding  
3 Full report of how the research literature 
was searched  
Section 3.1 presents the search for literature and Appendix B 
shows the full details of the database search including the exact 
databases and further sources, employed keywords, and the date 
of the search. 
4 Full disclosure of the rules for study (or 
effect size) inclusion/exclusion  
Section 3.1 discusses the full set of inclusion criteria. An 
overview of the sample and its characteristics is given in 
Appendix C and Appendix D. 
5 Statement addressing who searched, read 
and coded the research literature  
At the beginning of Section 3, we discuss the procedure for the 
coding of the data. 
6 Complete list of the information coded 
for each study or estimate  
Table 4 gives an overview of all explanatory variables that have 
been coded. These variables also comprise the different 
dimension of explanatory variables suggested in the guidelines. 
MRA modeling issues  
7 Descriptive statistics of the variables that 
are coded (means and standard 
deviations) and graph(s) displaying the 
effect sizes  
Table 4 presents the means and standard deviations of the 
explanatory variables. A funnel plot of the effect size estimates is 
shown in Appendix F. As an example, the funnel plot for the 
effect between capital structure and profitability is described in 
the results section in detail as displayed in Figure 1.    
8 Fully reported multiple MRA, along with 
the exact strategy used to simplify it (e.g., 
general-to-specific) 
Section 5 and Table 5 refer to our baseline FAT-PET-WLS 
models. The results table contains all relevant estimation models 
with a description of the model specifications, goodness-of-fit 
statistics, and sample sizes. The results for the extended multiple 
models are further displayed in Table 7. 
9 Investigation of publication, selection, 
and misspecification biases 
Table 5 through Table 7 include the funnel asymmetry test for 
publication bias. The extended regression models controls for 
publication selection as well as several sources of 
misspecification bias (e.g., inclusion of important control 
variables like firm size). 
10 Methods to accommodate 
heteroscedasticity and within-study 
dependence  
The FAT-PET-WLS models in Table 5, Table 6 respectively, are 
based on cluster-robust standard errors, weighted least squares 
(WLS) multilevel models respectively. The results for the 
extended multiple MRA in Table 7 are again based on cluster-
robust standard errors. 
11 Results from MRA model specification 
tests, robustness checks or sensitivity 
analyses  
Table 6 presents the results from the robustness test. This means 
an alternative specification of the within-study dependencies in 
the form of a multilevel model. 
This table shows the reporting guidelines by Stanley et al. (2013) in the first column and the fulfillment of each requirement in the 






Appendix B: Overview of the literature search process in electronic databases 
Database ABI/Inform Complete  
(via ProQuest) per November 19, 2015 
Business Source Premier, EconLit, GreenFILE 
(via EBSCOhost) per November 19, 2015 
SSRN 
(via ProQuest) per November 19, 2015 
Search command TI((capital structure OR Leverage OR Financing) AND 
(deter* OR affect* OR predict* OR factor* OR sample* 
OR evidence OR result* OR data OR investigat* OR test* 
OR empiric* OR survey* OR examine*)) 
ttl((capital structure OR Leverage OR Financing) AND 
(deter* OR affect* OR predict* OR factor* OR sample* 
OR evidence OR result* OR data OR investigat* OR test* 
OR empiric* OR survey* OR examine*)) 
TI((capital structure OR Leverage OR Financing) AND 
(deter* OR affect* OR predict* OR factor* OR sample* 
OR evidence OR result* OR data OR investigat* OR test* 
OR empiric* OR survey* OR examine*)) 
Search options Language: English 
Date range: until November 19, 2015 
Peer reviewed only 
Language: English 
Date range: until November 19, 2015 
Document type: Working paper 
Search results 868 856 298 
Number of studies after the title 
check  
363 249 82 
Relevant after content check  242 181 51 
 
Number of relevant studies from backward search Number of relevant studies from forward search 
Number of relevant studies from authors’ publication 
lists 
 145 141 0 
Total number of relevant 
studies without duplicates  
591 
The table presents the details of the literature search procedure started on November 19, 2015. Beneath the names of the electronic databases, the individual search command as well as the search options are listed. Afterwards, 
the numbers of search results are noted together with the numbers of remaining studies after checking the title in a first iteration and the content check in a second iteration. Based on the relevant studies, a backward search, a 
forward search, a data request for unavailable data, as well as a check of author’s publication lists (for authors who wrote more than one relevant study) are performed. The corresponding numbers are given below. The last row 












Appendix D: Overview of the final primary study sample for the MRA  
 (reference list available on request)  
# Author(s) (Year) Published 
 
Number of observed 
firms 
Observation period Observed countries 
Top articles 
1 Antoniou et al. 2008 Y 4854 1987-2000 France, Germany, Japan, UK, US 
2 Anwar and Sun 2015 Y 20515 2000-2007 China 
3 Bae et al. 2012 Y 10562 2003-2007 US 
4 Barclay et al. 2003 Y 5765 1980-1999 US 
5 Bathala et al. 1994 Y 516 1988-1988 US 
6 Berger et al. 1997 Y 452 1984-1991 US 
7 Bhagat et al. 2011 Y 1101 1993-2007 US 
8 Bharath et al. 2008 Y 2575 1973-2002 US 
9 Bock and von Guericke 2013 Y 48 2010-2010 Germany 
10 Caglayan and Rashid 2013 Y 5436 1999-2008 UK 
11 Cole 2013 Y 3841 1987-2003 US 
12 Cook and Tang 2010 Y 2493 1976-2005 US 
13 Crutchley and Hansen 1989 Y 603 1981-1985 US 
14 De Jong et al. 2007 Y 11845 1997-2001 Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, UK, US, Indonesia 
15 Driffield et al. 2007 Y 452 1994-1998 Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand 
16 Erol and Tirtiroglu 2011 Y 13 1997-2007 Turkey 
17 Fan et al. 2012 Y 36767 1991-2006 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Switzerland, Chile, China, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, 
France, UK, Greece, Hong Kong, Indonesia, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Malaysia, 
Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand, 
Turkey, Taiwan, US, South Africa, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Switzerland, Chile, China, 
Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, UK, Greece, Hong Kong, Indonesia, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, 
Japan, Korea, Mexico, Malaysia, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, 
Singapore, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Taiwan, US, South Africa 
18 Faulkender and Peterson 2005 Y 4219 1986-2000 US 
19 Frank and Goyal 2009 Y 4644 1950-2003 US 
20 Friend and Lang 1988 Y 984 1979-1983 US 
21 Gaud et al. 2005 Y 104 1991-2000 Switzerland 
22 Giambona et al. 2007 Y 57 1997-2003 US 
23 Gilson 1997 Y 108 1980-1989 US 
24 Graham 1999 Y 10100 1973-1994 US 
25 Harford et al. 2008 Y 1188 1976-2005 US 
26 Harrison et al. 2011 Y 127 1990-2008 US 
27 Hirota 1998 Y 500 1977-1992 Japan 
28 Hovakimian 2006 Y 2813 1983-2002 US 
29 Hovakimian et al. 2001 Y 2073 1979-2000 US 
30 Hovakimian et al. 2004 Y 736 1982-2000 US 
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31 Huang and Ritter 2009 Y 3376 1969-2001 US 
32 Huyghebaert and Van de Gucht 2007 Y 244 1992-1992 Belgium 
33 Jensen et al. 1992 Y 565 1982-1987 US 
34 Johnson 1997 Y 847 1989-1989 US 
35 Kale et al. 1991 Y 238 1984-1985 US 
36 Kim and Sorensen 1986 Y 156 1978-1980 US 
37 Lasfer 1995 Y 88 1972-1983 UK 
38 Lemmon et al. 2008 Y 5791 1965-2003 US 
39 Lin and Flannery 2013 Y 3051 1998-2009 US 
40 Lin et al. 2008 Y 494 1992-1996 US 
41 Mittoo and Zhang 2008 Y 965 1998-2002 Canada, US 
42 Ovtchinnikov 2008 Y 4224 1966-2006 US 
43 Petacchi 2015 Y 5285 1996-2004 US 
44 Rajan and Zingales 1995 Y 4557 1987-1991 Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK, US 
45 Roberts and Sufi 2009 Y 4425 1996-2005 US 
46 Schmid 2013 Y 695 1995-2009 Germany 
47 Shivdasani and Stefanescu 2010 Y 1309 1991-2003 US 
48 Taub 1975 Y 89 1960-1969 US 
49 Titman and Wessels 1988 Y 469 1974-1982 US 
50 Xu 2012 Y 3938 1989-2004 US 
Randomly selected articles 
1 Abor 2008 N 230 1998-2003 Ghana 
2 Abor and Biekpe 2007 Y 160 1998-2003 Ghana 
3 Akhtara and Oliver 2005 N 360 1994-2003 Japan 
4 An 2012 Y 45681 2002-2008 China 
5 Bartoloni 2013 Y 2591 1996-2003 Italy 
6 Bhaduri 2002 Y 363 1989-1995 India 
7 Bhole and Jitendra 2004 Y 330 1984-2000 India 
8 Campenhout and Caneghem 2013 Y 614 1998-2007 Belgium 
9 Chen and Chen 2011 Y 647 2005-2009 Taiwan 
10 Chen et al. 2013 Y 1481 2011-2011 China 
11 Chhapra and Asim 2012 N 90 2005-2010 Pakistan 
12 Chkir and Cosset 2001 Y 71 1987-1991 US 
13 Crutchley et al. 1999 Y 812 1987-1993 US 
14 Dang 2013 Y 635 1980-2007 France, Germany, UK 
15 Daskalakis and Thanou 2010 N 1018 2003-2007 Greece 
16 Gill et al. 2009 Y 300 2004-2005 US 
17 Gottardo and Moisello 2013 Y 3006 2001-2010 Italy 
18 Hassan et al. 2012 N 90 2005-2010 Malaysia 
19 Hussain et al. 2015 Y 45 2003-2012 Malaysia 
20 Jamal et al. 2013 Y 69 2007-2011 Malaysia 
21 Kant 2014 N 48 2004-2010 Netherlands 
22 Kara and Erdur 2015 Y 48 2006-2014 Turkey 
23 Khrawish and Khraiwesh 2010 Y 30 2001-2005 Jordan 
24 Kumar and Bodla 2014 Y 430 1991-2007 India 
25 Kuoki and Said 2012 Y 244 1997-2007 France 
26 La Rocca et al. 2010 Y 9515 2000-2000 Italy 
27 Li et al. 2009 N 83414 2000-2004 China 
28 Li et al. 2011 Y 8000 2002-2002 China 
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29 Lopéz-Garcia and Sánchez 2007 Y 858 1997-2004 Spain 
30 Mittoo and Zhang 2010 Y 339 1990-2003 Canada, US 
31 Olakunle and Jones 2014 Y 216 1997-2007 Nigeria 
32 Ozkan 2001 Y 390 1987-1996 UK 
33 Palacín-Sánchez et al. 2013 Y 13838 2004-2007 Spain 
34 Qureshi et al. 2011 Y 22 1988-2006 Pakistan 
35 Rezaei and Habashi 2012 Y 127 2006-2010 Iran 
36 Salawu and Agboola 2008 Y 33 1990-2004 Nigeria 
37 Sangeetha and Sivathaasan 2013 Y 50 2002-2006 Sri Lanka 
38 Schoubben and van Hulle 2004 N 587 1992-2002 Belgium 
39 Seelanatha 2010 Y 752 1999-2005 China 
40 Serrasqueiro et al. 2014 Y 659 1996-2007 Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, UK, US 
41 Serrasquiero et al. 2012 Y 854 1999-2005 Portugal 
42 Tian et al. 2015 Y 1485 1999-2011 China 
43 Tong and Green 2005 Y 44 2002-2003 China 
44 Ukaegbu and Oino 2013 Y 2268 2004-2008 Nigeria 
45 Vo and Nguyen 2014 Y 81 2007-2012 Vietnam 
46 Wellalage and Locke 2013 Y 40 2003-2010 New Zealand 
47 Westgaard et al. 2008 Y 308 1998-2006 UK 
48 Wu et al. 2013 Y 340 1990-1999 Netherlands 
49 Yarram 2013 Y 465 2004-2010 Australia 
50 Yusuf et al. 2015 Y 57 2006-2011 Jordan 
This table shows study characteristics for the underlying sample of primary studies analyzed in the MRA. In the second column, “Y” stands for published literature. Gray literature, such as dissertations, working and conference papers are marked by “N”. The third 
column shows the number of firms analyzed in the respective study. If not directly presented, the number of firms is calculated from the number of observations. If a study uses different subsamples, the sample size corresponds to the mean number of firms. 




Appendix E: Formulas for the calculation of effect sizes 
Effect size Partial correlation r Fisher’s z-transformed correlations 

















This table presents the formulas for the calculation of the effect sizes and the corresponding standard errors (SE). Beside the effect 
sizes (partial correlation r and Fisher’s z), t denotes the test statistic from the t-test applied on the regression slopes measuring the 
relation between capital structure and a certain determinant, df represents the degrees of freedom related to this test statistic, and n 
stands for the sample size of the respective sample used in the regression of the primary study.  
If the level of significance is only given by asterisks, the corresponding upper limits are used as p-value (*** = 0.01, ** = 0.05 and so 
on). For results without an asterisk, p = 0.5 is used following the recommendation by Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012). This procedure 




Appendix F: Funnel plots 
 
 
The figure presents the funnel plots for the analyzed effect sizes measuring the relationship between corporate capital structure and a certain determinant. In the 
absence of publication selection, the funnels should be symmetrically distributed around the most precise estimates. 
